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Another Look 
at 
the 
farm 
Problem 
Treating symptoms may relieve the pain but not effect a cure - unless the 
basic causes are recognized, understood and treated also. Here's a straight· 
forwa rd look at the two major farm problems we have today and at some possi· 
bilities for doi'ng something in the near future to overcome or solve them. 
by Earl 0. Heady 
OUR FARM economy has two 
major problems: ( 1) con-
tinuing overproduction - a long-
run problem and ( 2) the surplus 
stocks now on hand-a short-run 
problem. The surplus stocks, of 
course, are an outgrowth of the 
continuing overproduction. But 
both will have to1 be solved- and 
perhaps attacked in different 
ways-if resources in agriculture 
are to earn returns on a par with 
those in other industries. 
The essence of the overproduc-
tion problem is that, with the 
present and prospective produc-
tive capacity of its resources, ag-
riculture now has more resources 
than are needed to produce food 
for the nation . These resources 
are continuing to produce more 
food than the market will absorb 
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at prices g1vmg satisfactory in-
comes to farm families. 
The standard in measuring 
these incomes is the return to la-
bor and capital used. Over the 
last 10 years, the average return 
to labor and capital in agric.qlture 
consistently has been.- lower ~ than 
the average return to the same 
amount of resources used in other 
industries. And this situation is 
likely to continue for some time 
unless some major changes can be 
made in the structure of American 
agriculture. 
Surplus Production 
This long-run problem stems 
partly from general economic 
growth. As a nation grows eco-
nomically- particularly a wealthy 
nation in which consumers gener-
ally have good incomes- the pos-
sibilities for agricultural expan-
sion aren't nearly as great as for 
many nonfarm industries . The 
reason lies in the way consumers 
(who are relatively well fed and 
well off) spend their growing in-
comes. 
Studies show that for each 1-
percent rise in income, consumers 
may spend more than 1 percent-
sometimes as much as 2 percent-
on many items such as health, 
recreation, education, transporta-
tion, housing and home furnish-
ings. As incomes continue to 
grow, consumers "invite" (by 
their spending) the use of more 
resources in these industries. Be-
cause consumers want these 
things so much, they handsomely 
reward the resources used in these 
industries. 
The effect on agriculture is dif-
ferent when food is plentiful. 
When consumers' incomes in-
crease by 1 percent, they increase 
their spending for food by much 
less than this. And most of this 
increased spending doesn't go for 
more food in total. It goes most-
ly for improved diets and food 
services, including freezing, pack-
aging, additional processing, res-
taurant services, etc., rather than 
for more pounds of food per per-
son. Some shift in the quality of 
products eaten takes place, but it 
mostly replaces other products or 
other qualities. 
The main opportunity for agri-
culture to expand has been with 
and at the rate of population 
growth. Certain other industries 
' such as those mentioned, can ex-
pand profitably at a much faster 
rate. Both population and na-
tional income growth set the pace 
for them. But, without important 
new markets, population growth 
alone is the chief pacer for agri-
culture. If it produces more than 
can be absorbed by population 
growth, agriculture generally finds 
itself with too much output, sur-
pluses and lowered prices. 
This is in distinct contrast to 
certain nonfarm industries which 
can absorb productivity gains 
which exceed population growth. 
They're rewarded also by nation-
al and per-person income gro1Vth 
as consumers actually · increase 
their spending for the goods and 
services offered. 
Farm production has increased 
much more rapidly than has the 
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demand for it arising either from 
( 1 ) population growth or ( 2) in -
creasing consumer incomes. This 
is the heart of the long-run prob-
lem of agriculture in the United 
States. 
Mechanization and improved 
production techniques, meanwhile, 
also have made it possible for 
fewer persons to produce this in-
creasing output. During World 
War II and the years following, 
we experienced an unprecedented, 
almost explosive, adoption of new 
technology on the nation's farms . 
The demand for farm products 
tapered off following the war. But 
the pricing structure after the war 
continued to encourage both in-
creased output and increased use 
of new technology by making 
both unusually profitable relative 
to actual demand. 
Agriculture has already made 
some changes because of this sit-
uation. Over 1939-50, the num-
ber of commercial farms in the 
nation dropped by 2 7 percent, and 
the average size of commercial 
farms increased by about 50 per-
cent. The number of persons em-
ployed in agriculture declined by 
2 5 percent in this same period 
and dropped another 2 5 percent 
during the 1950-58 period. 
Surplus Stocks • . . 
The immediate short-run prob-
lem is our mammoth surplus 
stocks of wheat, feed grains and 
cotton. While this short-run prob-
lem is "part and parcel" of the 
long-run problem, it's not entirely 
the same problem. The changes 
that are taking place in response 
to the long-run problem offer no 
immediate promise of solving the 
short-run surplus problem. 
Currently, as some operators 
leave the farm for opportunities 
elsewhere, their farm usually is 
consolidated with that of a nearby 
neighbor. And, as it turns out, 
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the operator remaining often has 
more capital and the management 
ability to get greater yields. 
Likewise, solving the present 
problem of surplus stocks won't 
automatically solve the long-run 
problems of agriculture stemming 
from national economic growth. 
Insurmountable? ... 
We're all pretty much aware of 
the size of the short-run surplus 
problem. The carryover of feed 
grains at the end of this year is 
predicted to total 70 million tons 
-compared with a "normal" an-
nual carryover of 20 million tons 
and an average annual use over 
the last 5 years, including exports, 
of 130 million tons. 
With corn acreage uncontrolled 
and average weather (and consid-
ering also that wheat stocks have 
some feed-grain potential), our 
grain stocks at the end of next 
year will be nearly as large as the 
normal usage of all feed grains in 
an average year. 
Considering the size of current 
stocks, it's easy to think that our 
first and most pressing problem is 
to reduce the size of these stocks. 
It is and, at the same time, it 
isn't. There's an even more press-
ing problem: To stop adding to 
these stocks. 
Let's face it. There's no "mag-
ic" way to reduce these stocks im-
mediately. At best, it would take 
several years to work the stocks 
down to a reasonable level. But 
to do this, even over a period of 
years, means that we'd have to 
stop adding to the stocks. 
We've all hoped to find some 
easy and workable formula to ex-
pand demand or to improve mar-
ket outlets for getting rid of our 
surpluses. But no such magic 
formula exists! 
Surplus stocks now are six times 
greater than the record 1957-58 
rate of feed-grain exports. And 
we can't expand domestic demand 
for feed grains to remove the sur-
plus rapidly. People can't eat the 
feed grains unless they're proc-
essed through livestock. But, if 
we increased livestock production 
enough to eat up the surplus in 
1 or 2 years, livestock prices 
would be highly unprofitable. 
So it seems that the best oppor-
tunity is in stopping additions to 
the feed-grain surplus, and, then, 
in using all of the methods at our 
disposal to reduce the surplus 
stocks over a 5- or 6-year period. 
Can It Be Done? . • . 
Could this be done? We'd need 
to work out a "timetable" for any 
such attempt. Let's "try one on 
for size." 
It's too late to do anything 
about the problem in 1959. With 
average weather, stocks will in-
crease because there are no con-
trols on corn acreage. Thus, the 
first chance to put any machinery 
in operation to cease adding to 
stocks would be in 1960. Needed 
then would be a vigorous program 
to keep annual production from 
exceeding annual use. 
With the very large stocks on 
hand, acreage might well be re-
duced to a point where production 
would fall somewhat short of an-
nual use. This operation would 
have to be continued for 4-6 years 
while: ( 1) We use every means 
possible to expand markets and to 
use up the excessive stocks now on 
hand; and (2) we use these years 
to make a transition to a more 
reasonable long-run structure of 
the national agricultural produc-
ing plant. 
What Method? The first im-
portant step would be to decide 
on an acceptable method to cut 
back production, say, in 1960. 
Unless we do so and get it into 
action, we'll add even more to a 
stockpile of grains that's going to 
be tremendous by next year. And 
we can't even begin to make 
p h y s i c a I arrangements before 
1960 to use up stocks. 
Even if it were to be fed in a 
short time--a possibility that's re-
mote and probably undesirable on 
a "quick-tempo" basis- we could 
not get more sows bred and more 
cattle into the feedlot until next 
year. And, even if we were able 
to export it all in 1 year (a pos-
sibility even more remote and 
harmful to foreign relations), we 
couldn't get the m a c h i n e r y 
cranked up to do a complete job 
in less than a year. 
The suggested first step is to 
stop adding to stocks which are 
already very large - because it 
can cost considerably less to pay 
j or not producing th.an to pay for 
producing and to pay j or the stor-
age costs in addition. 
Producers participating w i th 
present price supports and whose 
grain moves into government-held 
stocks still pay their production 
costs. They get some returns on 
the crop but also bear, along with 
the public in general, the storage 
cost. These, like the surplus 
stocks, have been increasing an-
nually. There are ways, however, 
in which production could be re-
duced - with payments large 
enough to provide about the same 
returns as under the present sys-
tem-but without also having to 
cover either the costs o j growing 
or storing the crops. 
There are a number of ways 
this could be done. Some have 
suggested rigid production quotas. 
But it's an open question whether 
such a system is acceptable in our 
society. Another possibility is to 
apply an old principle-that of 
"supply and demand." 
Experience from the past -
whether for hogs, chickens, corn, 
milk or other farm products-has 
shown that if the price of a thing 
is high enough, the supply also 
will be high enough. This same 
principle would work in produc-
tion control: If a high enough 
price is paid, the "supply" of land 
going out of production also will 
be large enough. 
A high price? Higher than the 
current levels designed to do a 
part of this job. But the total cost 
probably would be considerably 
less than the current public outlay 
needed ( 1) to pay some farmers 
to take some land out of produc-
tion, though not enough to elimi-
nate the surplus buildup; (2) to 
provide support prices to others 
for producing more and offsetting 
the land taken out of production; 
and ( 3) to pay for storing the 
added surplus production. 
Avoid "Won't Work's": We 
know that the old methods of 
acreage control won't do the job. 
They haven't taken enough land 
out of production: (a) to make 
up for the trend in increased 
yields; (b ) to offset the tendency 
for the lowest-yielding land to go 
out of production first; and ( c) 
to offset the tendency for farmers 
to take out part of their acreage 
and then to more than make up 
for it by using the " released 
funds" to get a greater output 
from the remaining acres. 
Many producers enter parts of 
their farms in the acreage-control 
programs and then offset the acre-
age cut by using more fertilizer 
and better practices on the land 
that's left in production. And, in 
total, the acreage-control pro-
grams of the past have, in the 
main, merely shifted the relative 
surplus production from one crop 
to another. Producers, in effect, 
were asked to reduce the output 
of one surplus crop but allowed to 
shift production to other surph1s 
crops. 
Parts of the wheat and cotton 
surplus problems have been shift-
ed to feed grains in this way. 
During 1945-49, for example, 76 
million acres of wheat, 22 million 
acres of cotton and 164 million 
acres of feed grains, including 
soybeans, were produced. Over 
the 1954-58 period, we produced 
58 million acres of wheat, 16 mil-
lion acres of cotton and 174 mil-
lion acres of feed grains. 
The Great Plains area cut 
wheat acreage, but increased the 
acreage of feed grains. The South 
reduced cotton acreage, but di-
verted some of the acreage into 
feed grains. And even the Corn 
Belt and the Lake States increased 
feed-grain acreage between 1945-
49 and 1954-58 as producers shift-
ed away from corn into soybeans 
and grain sorghums. 
Attack Both Problems? In the 
short run, acreage might be taken 
out of production "across the 
board." The present "whole-
farm" approach to land retire-
ment provides some machinery 
for accomplishing this. But it 
might be necessary to extend such 
machinery to the limits allowed 
by community considerations and 
to spread it over more acres than 
at present. 
A different system of land re-
tirement would be needed in the 
long run, however. In this case, 
it would be better to withdraw 
land by regions where a perma-
nent shift is needed in agricultural 
production and resource use. 
If agriculture is to be meshed 
with national economic growth 
and the real social challenges that 
lie ahead, it will be necessary to 
concentrate more on leaving in 
production the land with the 
greatest comparative advantage in 
productivity of capital and man-
power - with less production 
where the comparative advantage 
is lower. 
Thus, some of the land which 
needs to be or might be taken out 
of production to meet the immedi-
ate surplus situation wouldn't be 
the same as that needed to meet 
the long-run growth and produc-
tivity problem. Research is in 
progress at Iowa State in analyz-
ing possibilities for the latter, and 
we'll report some of the results 
soon in IowA FARM SCIENCE. 
Needed first, however, is think-
ing and action so that we can stop 
adding to the surpluses each year. 
And this is needed quickly. Then, 
the next 5 years, or whatever pe-
riod is necessary, can be used to 
reduce existing stocks through 
whatever gains can be made in 
demand and market expansion. 
5.337 
